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Abstract
A prior model of competitive bidding for offshore petroleum leases
is subjected to more extensive empirical testing based on underlying
geological data prepared by the US Geological Survey. The current
results strongly reinforce the tentative conclusions advanced in the
previous paper, and demonstrate the robustness of the model. In light
of the current results, it seems very likely that participants in
offshore lease sales behave as if their operations were physically
constrained such that only a limited volume of petroleum reserves are
pursued in any one sale.

FURTHER RESULTS ON EQUILIBRIUM PATTERNS OF COMPETITION
IN OCS LEASE SALES
I. Introduction
Previous studies have examined factors that influence the degree of
competition in the auction market for outer continental shelf (OCS)
petroleum leases. In general, these studies concur in finding that the
underlying "quality" or economic potential of an offered tract is a pri-
mary determinant of the number of bidders it will draw. For example,
Gaskins and Teisberg [1976] present a game-theoretic model in which the
equilibrium number of bidders for an individual tract is determined
directly as a function of the tract's inherent value. The bidding models
of Rothkopf [1969] and Wilson [1977] are consistent with this result.
At the empirical level, studies by the U.S. Geological Survey [1978] and
Gribbin et. al. [1979] demonstrate that the number of bidders for indivi-
dual tracts is highly correlated with many widely varied measures of per-
ceived tract quality.
Although the studies cited above focus on the degree of competition
to obtain a single tract, we have previously demonstrated (Smith [1982])
how their approach can be extended to characterize the spatial distri-
bution of bids when multiple tracts are offered simultaneously. The
intuition is simple. When several tracts are offered simultaneously, a
bidder will generally not be indifferent regarding the choice of specific
tracts on which to bid. For example, a large and promising geological
structure which underlies a tract may offer the potential for consider-
able profit, and thereby attract many bidders. However, we do not expect
less promising tracts to be neglected entirely, because alert firms would
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recognize that against no competition even lower quality properties can
be acquired on a profitable basis. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect
a pattern of competition to develop that equalizes expected profit oppor-
tunities among all offered tracts and render potential bidders indifferent
regarding the tracts on which they bid. Any spatial distribution of bids
that does not equalize expected profit opportunities cannot be in equi-
librium since participating firms would have an incentive to redirect
their bids.
In the previous paper we developed a theoretical model of the auction
market that embodies this intuition. The model is consistent with pre-
vious studies in that variations in the degree of competition across
tracts are directly related to variations in inherent economic value.
However, the equilibrium distribution of bids is also influenced by struc-
tural characteristics of the market itself. Specifically, the extent of
variations in the degree of competition across tracts is damped somewhat
if auction participants are constrained by physical limitations on the
volume of petroleum reserves which they can pursue at one time; and damped
completely if auction participants are constrained by financial limita-
tions on the amount of money they can expose at any one time. Variations
in the degree of competition across tracts were shown to be greatest if
the auction participants were subject to no bidding constraints, apart
from the general objective to maximize expected profits. The distinctive
implications that devolve from the three behavioral assumptions (uncon-
strained bidding, physically constrained bidding, and financially con-
strained bidding) can then be used to judge which behavioral assumption
is most consistent with observed bidding patterns.
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Using data available in the public domain, we demonstrated pre-
viously that the assumption of financially constrained bidding can be
rejected quite strongly. Using a much smaller data set (59 tracts taken
from two OCS sales) made available to the author by a major U.S. oil
company, we also showed that the hypothesis of unconstrained bidding
can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of physically
constrained bidding. In the present paper, we present new results which
strongly reinforce these conclusions on the basis of a much broader data
set provided by the U.S. Geological Survey (657 tracts taken from seven
OCS sales). Our new results are significant not only because they are
based on a more complete sample, but also because they are based on under-
lying geological data prepared by a separate source.
2. Review of the Model
We assume that T distinct tracts are auctioned simultaneously, and
that these tracts constitute independent investment opportunities. The
t tract is characterized by its expected petroleum reserve volume, R
,
and expected net economic value V ; where:
(1) V = a • R^ for t = 1,...,T.
Parameter E is an index of scale economies in reserve development. Its
value must exceed unity since it is known that a greater deposit size
enhances the net economic value of each unit of reserves.
The number of competitors for the t tract is denoted by n
,
and
the expected value of the winning bid by B (n ) ; where:
-4-
(2)
t t n
V for t=l,...,T.
Parameter y represents an arbitrary constant (cf. Smith [1982]).
Under these assumptions, we can write explicitly the necessary
condition for an unconstrained competitive equilibrium:
(3)
R.
l
3 J
e/2
for all i and j
.
Similarly, the condition for a physically constrained equilibrium is:
(e-D/2
(4)
R.
l
R.
L J.
for all i and j
Given data regarding the number of bidders and volume of reserves
associated with respective tracts, Equations (3) and (4) provide alter-
native estimates of the scale parameter, e. The estimates are derived
as follows. First estimate the simple linear model:
(5) lnOa./n.) = I • ln(R
±
/R.).
The hypothesis of unconstrained bidding then implies the following
estimate of scale economies: e =2*6. The hypothesis of physically
constrained bidding implies a somewhat different estimate: e = 2 • 6+1.
The plausibility of the alternative hypotheses can then be judged in
terms of their respective implications regarding the magnitude of econo-
mies of scale, about which we do have some prior information. Specifi-
cally, we would reject any hypothesis that implies an estimate of £ that
is significantly less than 1.
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3. The Data
The model is implemented in the manner reported previously (Smith
[1982]). Data regarding number of bidders per tract are taken from the
U.S. Geological Survey [1978a], Estimates of the volume of reserves
(oil plus gas equivalent) underlying each tract were also provided to
the author by the U.S. Geological Survey. These data reflect the best
estimates, as of the date of sale, of the recoverable reserves underlying
each tract. Specific tracts and lease sales included in the analysis are
recorded in Table 1.
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA SET
OCS Sale Number of Tracts Number of Tracts
Number Date Location Receiving Bids Included in Study*
33 03/28/74 Louisiana 114 103
34 05/29/74 South Texas 123 111
35 12/11/75 South California 70 61
36 10/16/74 Louisiana 157 115
37 02/04/75 South Texas 143 110
39 04/13/76 Alaska 81 69
40 08/17/76 Mid-Atlantic 101 88
*0nly tracts for which petroleum reserve data were not available have
been excluded from the analysis.
4. Results
Estimates of the scale parameter (e) derived by the procedure de-
scribed above are reported in Table 2. We can summarize the results by
saying that the data strongly favor the hypothesis of physically con-
strained bidding and completely reject the hypothesis of unconstrained
bidding. Under the hypothesis of physically constrained bidding, the
implied estimates of e are significantly greater than 1.0 at the 90%
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confidence level (one-tailed test) in five of seven sales. For the other
two sales, the estimates of z are close to, but insignificantly different
than 1.
TABLE 2
ESTIMATES OF THE SCALE PARAMETER
Estimated Returns to Scale (e)
(standard errors in parentheses)
Sale 33
Unconstrained (e ) Constrained
A
0.189
(0.065)
0.379
(0.130)
1.379
(0.130)
0.104
(0.058)
0.209
(0.117)
1.209
(0.117)
0.080
(0.055)
0.160
(0.110)
1.160
(0.110)
-0.017
(0.042)
-0.034
(0.085)
0.966
(0.085)
0.048
(0.056)
0.096
(0.113)
1.096
(0.113)
0.275
(0.055)
0.551
(0.110)
1.551
(0.110)
0.401
(0.241)
0.803
(0.482)
1.803
(0.482)
0.156
(0.035)
0.312
(0.071)
1.312
(0.071)
Sale 34
Sale 35
Sale 36
Sale 37
Sale 39
Sale 40
All Sales
(pooled)
Estimates of £ derived under the hypothesis of unconstrained bidding
behave quite differently. All of these estimates are significantly less
than 1.0, with the exception of sale #40 where the estimated value is
still appreciably less than 1.0 in magnitude, but with a large standard
error.
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In order to obtain a comprehensive test of the alternative hy-
potheses, data from all seven sales were pooled to form a single data set.
Equation (5) was then re-estimated on the basis of pooled data, with
results as shown at the bottom of Table 2. Again, the hypothesis of
unconstrained bidding is strongly rejected (e = .312), while the hy-
pothesis of constrained bidding yields an estimate of e that is quite
plausible (e = 1.312). Thus, the behavior of the estimating equation
is quite consistent across all sales and conforms very closely to the
results reported in the previous paper (Smith [1982]).
5. Conclusions
The model discussed above appears to be quite stable and robust.
It has been tested against bidding patterns in seven OCS lease sales
using two independent sources of petroleum reserve data. The results
are consistent across sales and invariant to the choice of data source.
The tentative conclusion advanced in the previous paper is strengthened
considerably in light of this analysis. It now seems very likely
that participants in OCS sales behave as if their operations were
physically constrained such that only a limited volume of reserves can
be pursued in any one sale. Such constraints might arise, for example,
if firms attempted to maintain targeted reserve inventory levels, or
if they are constrained by limited geological and managerial staff avail-
able to appraise offshore prospects and formulate appropriate bids.
Subject to constraints of this type, bidding behavior does appear to
be consistent with the principle of expected profit maximization. At
least these assumptions yield an estimated scale parameter that is
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plausible. This much cannot be said for the alternative behavioral
assumptions that were examined in this and the previous paper.
The significance of these results for public leasing policy is quite
clear. The Secretary of Interior has recently announced a rapidly
accelerated schedule of lease sales that would open vast amounts of
acreage for leasing and confront industry with an unprecedented number
of OCS tracts. Numerous objections have been raised to this plan, moti-
vated primarily by environmental concerns and the fear that capital re-
quirements necessitated by accelerated leasing would exceed the in-
dustry's ability to raise money. Our results do not support the argu-
ment that capital constraints have bound firms' actions in the past,
although it is clear that under an accerlerated leasing schedule future
capital requirements would be larger than those experienced previously.
Our results do raise a separate concern, however, that the industry may
be constrained in its pursuit of tracts by physical or operating factors
that restrict the total volume of petroleum reserves that can enter
the exploration and development process within a relatively short period
of time
.
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